

~~INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST TRENDS~~

The Sino-Soviet Controversy in Cuba and

Other Latin American Countries

~~A Background Brief~~

I. Introduction

I. Introduction

Since 1952, and particularly since 1956, Chinese Communist influence on Latin American CP's has been apparent in the formulation of programs and policies geared to the strategy of the "united democratic front of national liberation." Procedures such as the systematic analysis of economic and political groupings and their ~~respective~~ potentials for Communist exploitation in a struggle against the most important common enemy (US imperialism) reflect the application of tactics recommended by Mao Tse-tung. These tactics are described in Mao's writings, such as "Tactical Problems in the United Anti-Japanese Front," which since ~~about~~ 1956 have been translated into Spanish for distribution and study in Latin America. Mao's works, as well as those of Lui Shao-ch'i and probably other Chinese Communist leaders, have also been used in the training courses arranged for Latin Americans by the Communist Party of China. ^(CPC) These courses have emphasized the agrarian base of the Chinese revolution, the techniques of clandestine party organization and action, and the history and success of the armed ^{conflict} struggle in ~~terms of~~ the long drawn-out struggle against the Kuomintang and the Japanese.

It is apparent that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) encouraged the Latin American CP's to avail themselves of the lessons of the Chinese revolution, in view of the similarity of political, economic, and social conditions in China and Latin America (i.e., existence of foreign economic imperialism, feudalistic survivals in rural life, and a generally low level of industrial development). For example, the Brazilian CP program formulated in 1953-54 under

CPSU guidance reflected certain points emphasized in Chinese tactics, and in mid-1955 Latin American CP's began to acknowledge the importance of the Chinese ~~Revolution~~ in their programmatic documents. In early 1956, the Twentieth CPSU Congress gave official recognition to the doctrine of ~~many roads~~ to Socialism, and increased attention began to be paid to the Chinese experience (in contrast to that of the Soviets and the European satellites) as illustrative of progress from "semi-feudal, semi-colonial forms" toward Socialism. Thus, the Costa Rican CP, after studying Manuel Mora's report on the XX CPSU Congress, passed a resolution which quoted the Soviet Manual of Political Economy on the importance of the Chinese ~~Revolution~~. While in Moscow, Latin American delegates to the Twentieth CPSU Congress were invited to China, where in the spring and summer of 1956 they participated in seminars and tours. Later in the year many Latin American CP leaders attended the Eighth Congress of the CCP as fraternal representatives. Since 1956, the training of Latin American CP members in China has been placed on an organized and permanent basis, ~~cultural exchanges~~ have grown, and Chinese theoretical and propaganda publications have been translated and increasingly disseminated in Spanish.

This gradually increasing emphasis on the study of the Chinese experience has developed with the concurrence and support of the CPSU. Yet with the development of personal contacts between the Latin Americans and the Chinese, some indications of Sino-Soviet rivalry and disagreement also appeared. Thus, one of the first Latin American students to return from a CCP training school was told, in 1958, by Latin American specialists of the CPSU, that Chinese plans for communes were "too early and too risky." The student noted that these specialists were more conciliatory ~~with respect~~ to Tito than were the Chinese, ~~that~~ they regarded some Chinese claims as exaggerated and, by innuendo, played them down. The Soviets

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were keenly interested in the students' impressions of the CCP course, and indicated that they also were considering a CPSU for Latin Americans ^{only} alone. On the other hand, the student noted that the Chinese, who were intensely interested in Latin America, had indicated disagreement with the Soviets on a number of points (the denigration of Stalin ^{and} on certain Soviet industrial methods), and had shown a fundamental belief in the inevitability of war with the USA.

A year later, another Latin American CP member returning from a similar CCP training course noted ~~his response to an inquiry~~ ^{Washington} that one lecturer had stated that "for the Chinese, there was no revolution in which arms were not used, thereby disagreeing with the pacifist policy of the USSR." This was the only indication of disagreement ^{on} with respect to international policy which he noticed, however, and he found the Chinese in general to be "very cautious" in mentioning other parties, emphasizing that "each country has its own peculiarities."

^{They} In general, it appears that prior to 1960, Sino-Soviet differences were not ~~being~~ emphasized to Latin Americans, made little impression on them, and did not, in themselves, cause friction or factionalism within the Latin American parties. In some cases, however, internal policy differences of long standing have ^{run} parallel to the international conflict, and have become identified with it as the Sino-Soviet dispute ~~has~~ sharpened and ~~as~~ the Soviets and Chinese ~~have~~ sought to develop support for their ~~respective~~ points of view. Now that the dispute has been discussed and publicized at international meetings, and is more generally understood, it is possible that there will be a greater tendency for elements within the Latin American parties ^{will} to interpret or identify their own views with those of the Soviets or the Chinese.

2. Cuba

II. Cuba

Of all the Latin American CP's, the Cuban CP (Partido Socialista Popular, PSP) has been most deeply concerned with the Sino-Soviet

controversy, because it bears on the party's own conflict with Fidel Castro and the 26th of July Movement. This conflict extends back to 1956, when the PSP officially established its policies concerning ~~the~~ armed struggle in Cuba. These were announced in a manifesto of September 1956, entitled "The Road of the People: August 1933." ~~This~~ stated that "we are not proponents of violence for its own sake, nor do we believe that violence is the only path...but when the despotic government...blocks the electoral path and seeks to maintain itself by force, there is not other remedy than extra-parliamentary action, that is, the direct struggle of the masses." However, it also pointed out that "The experience of 1930-33, when the putsch of Aguado, the mob assault of Rio Verde, the landing of Gibara, and the assault on the barracks of San Luis all failed, and when the general strike and the uprising of the masses in August 1933 triumphed; the experience of all revolutions and of all struggles for liberty; all such experience indicates that the correct, the best, and the most rapid--and the most secure and most popular--(course) is that proposed by the Party of the Cuban Revolution, the Popular Socialist Party: the development of the struggle of the masses and its culmination in a new August, in a powerful general strike and a decisive general uprising...."

In the September 1956 manifesto, the PSP referred to the unsuccessful attack on the Moncada barracks (which resulted in Castro's imprisonment in 1953) as "desperate and sterile."* Later in the year, in the official party theoretical organ Fundamentos,** the party paid even more

* It has subsequently been reported that when the 26th of July Movement was being organized in Mexico (about 1955-56) the Communists had sought, with the support of Raul Castro, to influence Fidel to abandon his plans for armed invasion of Cuba. When these efforts did not succeed, they instructed Raul to continue to go along with Fidel's plans.

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attention to the Fidelista movement:

"The 26th of July Movement raised the banner of insurrection at a predetermined place and without relation to the struggle of the masses...it recently introduced the idea of the general strike into its tactical concepts, but in an erroneous sense: only as an instrument of insurrection and not--as should be the case--as an element in the development of the mass struggle which may be followed, in certain cases, by an armed insurrection."

"Insurrection, moreover, is not a game. It is a very complicated and serious tactical procedure which should not be used...except under determined conditions. Otherwise, in most cases, insurrection will be no more than a putsch."

"...Lacking such conditions, it is indispensable that every true revolutionary contribute to the patient and 'gray' task of elevating the conscience of the vanguard..."

A year later, at the special conference of Latin American Communist party leaders held in Moscow in November 1957, the PSP still opposed Castro's tactics and his disinclination to unite with the PSP or to follow its line. The Cuban representative to this meeting noted that the sabotage of sugar cane (a 26th of July tactic under the direction of Rene Ramos Latour, known as "Daniel") was an unpopular, sectarian action which lacked sympathy among the workers, and that although the PSP had "attempted to guide the Fidelistas," the latter had not wanted to participate in coordinated mass action.

Intellectual leaders of the 26th of July Movement took notice of the Communist criticisms and, in turn, sought to establish their own ideological position. One of these leaders was Armando Hart Davalos, then clandestine coordinator of the movement and currently Minister of Education. Hart's ideas were published (after the rebel

* In the same issue of Fundamentos, the significance of the Chinese experience was described in an article entitled "Desde Pekin", by an anonymous author (possibly Cesar Escalante Dellunde, who is known to have been a delegate to the VIII CCP Congress and who probably participated in seminars in China).

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victory) in a commemorative issue of Revolucion (26 July 1959) under the title, "Justification of the Revolution and the Strategy against the Dictatorship, November 1956." Hart made the following points:

"On occasions, the revolution follows the course of pacifism. We do not deny that theoretically and under certain circumstances this may be the adequate path.... But possibly the most important experience that the new generation has learned has been that the revolution, at any moment and under any circumstance, must be prepared for direct action...."

"The 26th of July Movement represented a real categorical answer to this revolutionary need, not a theoretical speculation...."

"Opposed to it were those who spoke of peace. The external difference, apparently, between our line of conduct and that of the other organizations and parties, was that we publicly proclaimed the need for violence and the others advocated pacifist solutions. On the surface this appears to be a mere strategic discrepancy, ^{but} and has, nevertheless, its origin in a fundamental ideological discrepancy."

By identifying the 26th of July Movement as the only group which advocated armed action, Hart obviously places the [✓]Communists with those advocating [✓]peaceful solutions. [✓]He argues further that the purpose of violent action is not that of simple military victory, but is that of creating discontent, dissatisfaction, and opposition of such dimensions that the government will be unable to maintain itself in power. Thus by provoking the dictatorship to increased brutality and terrorism the public reaction is created which assures the dictator's overthrow. A quite similar point of view is held by ^{Ex. 151}"Che" ^AGuevara, who lists among the "fundamental contributions" of the Cuban revolution the proof that "it is not always necessary to wait for the fulfillment of all of the conditions for the revolution; the focus of insurrection can create them."

The existence of what Hart refers to as a "fundamental ideological discrepancy" between the Fidelistas and the Communists during the Sierra campaign is also indicated in a letter which was ^{reportedly} taken from [^]Hart when he was arrested by the Cuban army in early 1958. The letter,

unsigned and apparently meant for "Che"^g states in part:

"you have been rude as well as unjust. For you to believe that we are rightists or that we come from the petty Cuban bourgeoisie, or rather that we represent it... does not surprise me... since it is in line with your interpretation of the historical proceedings of the Russian revolution.... We have had no other course to follow, because your leaders perpetrated the formidable outburst of 1917... but left the peoples located outside that country without the opportunity to unchain a universal revolution.... The fatality of all this is that Stalin was not French, or English, or German, and was therefore unable to overcome the limited viewpoint of a Russian leader. ... If there can exist discrepancies between us over the international aspect of revolutionary politics, I consider myself among the more radical ones...."

There are indications that the author of the above letter, ^{who} was probably Hart himself, ~~did~~ did not consider himself to be a spokesman for Fidel^y but rather a member of a group whose goals were in accord with Fidel's. This may have been a re^eestablished Trotskyist group, inasmuch as the author states "do not ever identify me with persons who have dominated the CTC (Cuban Confederation of Labor) for the past 25 years" (i.e., the Trotskyist of the 1930's who founded the CTC but later became identified with Batista). In any event, the letter strongly suggests the existence within the 26th of July Movement of a dissident Communist element which condemned Stalin and Stalinism as opposed to the extension of the world revolution. It is possible that the same distrust of the

- possibly Che Guevara?*
- * Possibly "Che" Guevara, who may have been an advocate of cooperation with the Communists, with whom he had been associated. Although recently appearing to favor the Chinese line, "Che" had been a member of the Russian-Mexican Cultural Institute in Mexico and his wife had been closely associated with Soviet military intelligence agents. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that "Che" may, at this time, have been seeking to ^yguide the Fidelistas in terms of the orthodox CP line favoring unity and mass action. It is interesting that the letter refers to a copy of another letter, written by "Che" to "Daniel", which had been received (apparently by Hart) and which introduced the subject of "Che's" "legitimate doctrinal worries." "Daniel", in the end of 1957, had been placed in charge of the sabotage of the sugar harvest.

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"limited viewpoint of a Russian leader" may have later been applied to Khrushchev's conciliatory attitude toward the West.*

Beginning in March 1958, the PSP began to admit that the Castro movement had become a "movement of the masses" and that it was appropriate to support it actively in the field. Through the PSP organizational and material aid was given Castro, and CP members were encouraged to apply the lessons of the Chinese revolution with respect to work in rural areas and within the rebel forces. Nevertheless, mutual distrust between the PSP and the Fidelistas continued even after the agreements for collaboration which were worked out in 1958. During the early months of the Castro regime, there were numerous evidences of Fidel's distrust of the PSP and his determination to hold it in check. Undoubtedly, this distrust became greatly diluted as a result of the PSP's policy of support, the aid received from the Soviet bloc, and the influence of PSP advisors such as Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. *greatly diluted this distrust* At the same time, within the PSP it was recognized that Fidel was "wary" of the Communists closest to him, was "extremely individualistic", and felt that "his" revolution was the most advanced type because the workers were not the leading force. *at the same time,* One ~~CP~~ leader (Carlos Rafael Rodriguez) told the Brazilian CP in 1959 that CP leaders had little doubt that a crisis would eventually arise between Castro and the PSP, and that when this occurred the party planned to be in a position to seize full control of the government.

* It is of interest that a new Trotskyist party, which claimed to have had founding members among Fidel Castro's invasion force of 1956, was founded *on 6 February* in early 1960 in Guantanamo, Cuba. The party has not identified its leaders. In November 1960, an article in the Communist-controlled Italian newspaper *Il Paese* described four "currents" within the Cuban Revolution, one of which it called the "Trotskyist current", which it linked with extremism and the Chinese model.

(see The Internationalist, vol. IV, nos. 6, 7, 8, March 15, April 1, 15, 1960)

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It is against this background that the early indications of Chinese Communist influence, as a disruptive influence, must be placed. ~~It is~~ [✓] ~~evident~~ that the works of Mao Tse-tung, which the PSP had recommended for study in connection with the organization of Communist activity in the guerrilla territory, were appropriate and appealing to leaders of the 26th of July Movement. After the victory, the organization of the Agrarian Reform Institute provided another area for the application of the Chinese experience, and in October 1959 a source who was in contact with "Che" Guevara and other high officials of the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) expressed the opinion that the Soviets "do not have a chance in Cuba." He stated that INRA officials viewed China as the "model state" while ^{to be} ~~considering~~ the Soviets as "degenerate Communists."

Evidence of friction within the PSP itself, possibly related to ~~the~~ ^{struggle} earlier conflict with the 26th of July leaders and the developing Sino-Soviet conflict, came in January 1960. At this time it was reported that a group (unidentified) existed within the PSP which proposed that ~~the~~ older leaders step down and allow ~~the~~ younger members to assume nominal control of the party. This development was apparently based on the belief that the older leaders, including Secretary General Blas Roca, Juan Marinello, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, were too closely associated with the party's past collaboration with Batista, and that others could be more effective in view of the party's professed policy of all-out support of Fidel Castro. Significantly, these leaders (who are still in power) are those who helped formulate the 1956 policies which criticized the Fidelistas. It was also reported at this time that Blas Roca ~~was~~ ^{ed} heading a group within the party which decried the unconditional support ~~being given by the PSP to the~~ ^{of} Revolutionary Government of the grounds that Prime Minister Castro had ^{summed} ~~not given~~ total support to the Party, ^{and ed} pointing out that ^{this} ~~the~~ policy of unconditional support deprived the Party of ~~a~~ means of retaliation should Fidel

ever turn against it. Roca ^{was} claimed that the government was "riddled with Communist deviationists who prefer the Titoist or Maoist philosophy to the Soviet brand of Communism." He, Marinello, and Lazaro Pena were ^{reportedly} ~~then~~ advocating a concentrated effort to place known Communists, i.e., "Stalinists," in control of sections of the Cuban government.*

At this time (January 1960) Blas Roca, Marinello, and Pena were identified as heading a ~~XStalinist~~ faction within the PSP, which (at least in this pre-Summit period) distrusted Khrushchev as a ~~Xdeviationist~~ who might obstruct the aggressive, anti-US activities of the Latin American CP's in exchange for ~~Xconcessions~~ by Eisenhower. Lazaro Pena was quoted as saying, "Can you imagine what the Cuban people will say when one day Hoy proclaims that the Americans are not imperialists?" On the other hand, Pena was quoted as saying that "Blas Roca was right when he said that we should not give unconditional support to Fidel Castro and those damned Maoists." These statements ~~and the "Stalinist" orientation of the top PSP leaders~~ are indicative of the problems faced by the PSP leaders in seeking to follow the CPSU line and yet also simultaneously support the extremism of Fidel, Raul, and other administration leaders.

Although critical of Khrushchev's "pacifism," there ~~There~~ is no evidence that the ~~XStalinism~~ of the PSP leaders represented a ~~anti~~ pro-Chinese ~~or anti-Soviet~~ position. In March 1960 a very reliable source in contact with ~~high~~ PSP leaders reported that the PSP was "Soviet-oriented, well disciplined, and without factional strife." Yet it is clear that as the Sino-Soviet rift developed in 1960, the PSP leaders became increasingly concerned with their own position. In April, May, and

* It is possible that this ~~XStalinism~~ ^{doctrines} refers to Stalinism as opposed primarily to Trotskyism (not as opposed to Khrushchevism), ~~as~~ the reestablished Trotskyist St group was condemned by Blas Roca in the PSP organ Carta Semanal (4 April 1960) as a "counter revolutionary provocation."

June, Secretary General Blas Roca made a trip to the Soviet bloc and China, motivated in part by a desire to discuss the nature of Sino-Soviet disunity with leaders of other parties. He returned with no definite opinion on the matter, but impressed with its seriousness, and subsequently the PSP held a series of meetings in an attempt to formulate a stand. The leaders concealed their concern from the rank and file, however, and tried to minimize the importance of the controversy. The position of the Party leadership was probably as stated by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in July 1960, when he said privately that "it would be unwise to take a position with respect to the controversy, as the very line that one might oppose might become the accepted line." Nevertheless, pro-Soviet bias was indicated in his further remarks that "the CPSU had an enormous task in guiding the world Communist movement along the right road", and that the CPSU "must be moderate and attempt to maintain peace in view of the possibility that the imperialists, in their death-agonies, might strike blows which would imperil mankind." This statement, and the continued control of the PSP by the old leaders after the Eighth PSP Congress in August 1960, suggests that the PSP is indeed Soviet-oriented, and that the Chinese claims of Cuban CP support, made at the preliminary meeting held to consider the Sino-Soviet controversy in Moscow in October, did not refer to the party leadership. On the other hand, the PSP leadership has publicly reversed its earlier line to accommodate the 26th of July thesis. In his address at the VIII PSP Congress, Blas Roca stated that the attacks on the Moncada and Bayamo barracks were "not conceived as a classic coup or putsch, despite the manner in which they were carried out. ... They were not designed to take over the government...but... (to) form a center of revolutionary struggle. ... The great historical merit of Fidel lies in the fact that... he saw it was possible to defeat the tyranny by armed force."

From the foregoing, it seems apparent that the anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese influence in Cuba is located primarily outside the PSP, in the ranks of the 26th of July Movement and the governmental agencies, and among the younger members of the PSP. It is probably strongest among certain elements who fought in the Sierra and who were aware of revolutionary ideologies, among those exposed to Chinese revolutionary ideologies, ~~among those exposed~~ ^{seeing} to Chinese revolutionary literature, and among the new generation of Marxists, educated in the courses established by the Rebel Army and other government agencies which glorify the Sierra campaign and its leaders. These are unorthodox Communists, who to date have neither been clearly identified nor organized into a recognizable clique or group. They may include Raul Castro, who denies membership in the PSP, yet was once a member of the Communist Youth and who may be a ~~secret~~ member of the Party. Raul's militant, aggressive, extremist anti-US views give support to the Chinese policy of promoting East-West tension rather than reducing it. Raul was reportedly disappointed by the refusal of the Soviets to enter into a military pact with Cuba, which was one of his objectives in going to Moscow in the summer of 1960. He has given strong support to the establishment of the Cuban-Chinese Cultural Society and the New China News Agency office in Habana. In November 1959 he reportedly received verbal messages from the Chinese Foreign Minister through Faure Chomon (now Cuban Ambassador to the USSR) including a request that Raul "occupy the US Naval Base at Guantanamo immediately upon the beginning of a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan."*

* Other reports suggest that the Chinese, and the Trotskyist elements in Cuba, place greater emphasis on action against Guantanamo than does the PSP.

Raul has also been reported (without confirmation) to have been in contact with Chinese intelligence officials who, from Habana, were organizing the foundation of Communist Chinese cells throughout Latin America.

"Che" Guevara may be another vehicle for pro-Chinese influence, although he has stressed that the Cuban Revolution has followed its own Marxist path. Guevara's advocacy of armed struggle as the means of extending the Cuban revolution to other Latin American countries, his belief that armed struggle can be initiated before conditions for its success are present, and his praise of Chinese communes suggest a pro-Chinese orientation, though earlier in his career he appears to have been closely associated with the Soviets. Guevara also denies that he is a Communist, and there is no ^{proof that he is} ~~reason to believe him~~ a secret party member. Carlos Olivares Sanchez, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the principal coordinator of Cuban diplomatic and para-diplomatic activities in Latin America, is reported to be "a practicing Marxist with a preference in Communist theory toward Yugoslav and Red Chinese policies." (*) Olivares is very closely associated with Raul Castro, is Secretary of Foreign Relations of the 26th of July Movement, and one of the key officials involved in the extension of the Cuban liberation movement to the rest of Latin America.

Armando Hart, the Minister of Education, as previously mentioned, appears to represent an unorthodox brand of Communism, possibly associated with the revived Trotskyite movement. (It is of interest to note, parenthetically, that a new Latin American Popular Liberation Front containing Trotskyite elements, was organized in Argentina in early 1960, and

* The Chinese have been extremely antagonistic toward Yugoslav Communism. Thus this statement, at best, indicates only that Olivares is eclectic and not controlled by the PSP.

that one of the organizational meetings was held in Buenos Aires in the home of the father of "Che" Guevara. Other meetings took place in Buenos Aires under the aegis of Cuban and Bolivian diplomats.) Hart's wife, Haydee Santamaria, is head of the Casa de las Americas in Cuba, a front which is instrumental in financing and training revolutionary youth in other Latin American countries. In addition to those named above, there are probably others, among them officials who have been subjected to intense propaganda during visits to Communist China, who may favor the Chinese in the present dispute. At the present time, these cannot be identified. However, it is known that the Chinese feel that they have support in Cuba. They indicated this at the time of the preliminary meetings in Moscow in October 1960, and reportedly they were able to prevent the distribution in Cuba of certain issues of Problems of Peace and Socialism which favored the Soviet viewpoint.

~~Although this support does not appear to be well organized at present,~~

4 W With the establishment of a Chinese ^{Cambodia} Embassy in Cuba, and with the ideological controversy still potentially disruptive, it seems probable that the Chinese will seek to exploit the various dissidents, unorthodox Communists, and the extremists in the 26th of July Movement as a force in their favor.)

→ In this effort, they will be greatly aided by the actual presence on the Cuban scene of Chinese propagandists, technicians, and officials, among whom are CP members. ¶ The influx of Chinese visitors began in early 1959. The New China News Agency has had a staff, headed by Kung Mai, at its Latin American headquarters in Habana since mid-1959.

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In November 1959, the Communist Chinese Foreign Minister sent word to Raul Castro that twenty Chinese industrial and agricultural technicians would arrive in Cuba in January 1960. Later reports suggest that these arrived and have been engaged by INRA, *Dr. [unclear]* and in September 1960 it was reported that Chinese Communists were working on an agricultural cooperative in Caney, Oriente Province. Various Chinese delegations have also visited Cuba. For example, in October 1960 a group of Chinese trade unionists headed by Kang Yung-ho visited Cuba to participate in the WFTU-sponsored international labor meeting in support of Algeria, and later toured Cuban factories and talked with Cuban labor leaders. In addressing workers at one factory, Kang described how the Chinese had overcome their difficulties, had defeated the US embargo, and had developed production on the basis of their own resources. *the [unclear]* In November, a group of eight Chinese (including trade, banking, *the [unclear]* and NCNA officials, and interpreters) were ^{later} conducted on a tour of INRA cooperatives in Matanzas and briefed by Captain Julio Suarez, an extreme anti-American leftist who devoted much of his speech to a description of supposed American sabotage of the Cuban agricultural and industrial effort. The Chinese, during the tour, made suggestions concerning the need for ^{the} liquidation of counter¹revolutionaries and the strengthening of the militia at various installations. Even more extensive contacts in the future are indicated in the statements made by "Che" Guevara in China in December 1960, *in [unclear]* when he said that "twenty-four out of the hundreds of factories" to be built in Cuba in the next five years will be built with direct Chinese aid. By the close of 1960, Chinese anti-aircraft [✓] guns, bazookas, and mortars were reported to be in the hands of Cuban forces.

In summary, it is apparent that both ^{the} Soviets and the Chinese have an enormous stake in Cuba. Fidel Castro's ambition to export the Cuban revolution to the rest of Latin America is in accord with both Soviet and

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Chinese goals. Yet the Cuban government does not appear to be decisively ^{influenced} oriented either by the Soviet or the Chinese Communists. The orthodox Cuban Communist Party (the PSP) is controlled by old line pro-Soviet Communists who, although calling for complete support of Castro, have nevertheless regarded him with some misgivings. Castro's impetuosity and interest in military action (which resulted in the unsuccessful Dominican invasion and other revolutionary ventures) may not only be counterproductive and hinder the spread of Communism, but may also result in the extension of war and the development of a global conflict. This would not be in accord with Soviet policies of recent years, and although there are indications of Soviet approval of a more aggressive international Communist line in 1961, it is possible that the orthodox Communists still wish to avoid responsibility for Fidelista extremism (*)

To the Chinese, the extension of the armed struggle to other countries through the activities of the Castro government serves the immediate end of increasing international tensions and creating problems for the United States on a wide variety of fronts. The justification by 26th of July Movement leaders of sabotage, terrorism, and the initiation of violent action regardless of the preparation of the masses is in accord

* It may be significant, in this connection, that the unofficially Communist-controlled Italian daily, Il Paese, of 7 November 1960, identified four currents within the Cuban revolutionary movement: the "Nationalist" current (inspired by Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and active neutralism); the "Trotskyist" current, "which is inclined to assume extremist postures and is a partisan of the model of the Chinese Revolution"; and the "Communist" current, organized by the PSP and which, "after having corrected its errors," is today the most well-balanced and which, unlike the others, "still wishes to collaborate with the petty bourgeoisie." ^{Maoist and neutralism; the National Socialist current, (inspired by)}

with this Chinese goal of promoting tension. Moreover, the rural, agrarian, anti-imperialist characteristics of the Cuban revolution allow the Chinese opportunity for offering advice based on their own experience, even though they are not in a position to offer the same technical, material, and military aid as the Soviet bloc.

3. Mexico

In Mexico, recognition of the Sino-Soviet controversy within the middle ranks of the orthodox Communist Party (the Partido Comunista Mexicano, PCM) was reported in August 1960. At that time, Prisciliano Garza Escalante, a member of the Central Committee, told several Nuevo Leon state PCM leaders that he had recently returned from the USSR and China and was disturbed by the developing rift between these countries. He said the "greatest single factor causing the deterioration of relations" was the Soviet adherence to a tactical line described by the Chinese as being "weak and non-aggressive." Garza said the PCM must study the controversy and decide whether to support the Soviet or the Chinese party. Garza was reported as personally favoring the more aggressive action line of the Chinese.

About this same time, a "communication addressed to the Political Commission of the PCM, " allegedly by "a group of Chinese Communists in Cuba" indicates that the Chinese CP may have sought, through direct channels, to establish its position before the CP Mexico.* This

* It is possible that the foregoing statement of Chinese views originated with the Chinese delegation to the congress of the Cuban CP held in Habana in August 1960. It is not known that the Chinese used this occasion for stating their case to other fraternal delegates, though this is likely. Certainly the Sino-Soviet rift was discussed, as the Honduran delegate reported that the PSP "disparaged the differences" between the two powers. In referring to the rift, he stated that the Chinese "did not approve of trying to reach agreements with the West," and although they recognized the international leadership of the USSR, they believed that "more people will die from hunger under Capitalism than would die in a war."

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communication, presumably received in September 1960, outlined four points, which epitomized the Chinese position. These, in brief, were as follows:

a. War is inevitable and can break out at any moment.

It will be initiated by the imperialist bloc led by the United States, or by the United States alone without previous knowledge by its allies.

b. War must not be feared, even a nuclear war. It is not certain that such a war would destroy humanity, and, although devastating, it must be exploited to accelerate the pace of a transition to Socialism.

c. In some countries, a peaceful transition from Capitalism to Socialism is improbable because it has been proved that imperialism goes to the aid of the capitalistic system wherever the situation is maturing.

d. The transition from Capitalism to Socialism will be violent, but it is the obligation of the Communist parties to blame capitalist agents for it.

Another indication of direct Chinese action in defense of their ideological viewpoint was the distribution in Mexico of the book Long Live Leninism. In late September 1960 the first shipment of 2000 copies of the Spanish edition arrived in Mexico, and an additional 3000 copies were reportedly expected. This book has been used by the Chinese in their attack on Soviet views, and its distribution has been protested by various CP's in both bloc and non-bloc countries as injurious to Communist unity. It is possible that, from Mexico, the book has been distributed elsewhere in Latin America.

In Mexico, evidence of Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban influences must be viewed against a background of inter-party and intra-party rivalry,

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disagreement, and intrigue. To date there appears to be no clear reflection of the Sino-Soviet rift. However, there is considerable evidence of a growth of leftist ~~e~~^xtrémism which is supported from Cuba and which, as in Cuba, seems to involve youth and student elements, a revived Trotskyist party^t and dissident members of the Communist Party^v of Mexico. There are also indications that the Peoples' Socialist Party (PPS), which dominates the Mexican Communist movement, favors the Soviet position and, in the last year and a half, ~~may~~^{have} received increased Soviet support.

Within the orthodox Communist party (PCM), indirect Soviet guidance and possibly interference ~~was~~^{is} responsible for the overthrow in 1959-60 of Dionisio Encina, who symbolized Stalinism, and the rise to power in the party of Arnolando Martinez Verdugo and others favoring the Khrushchev line. The victorious anti-Encina group, however, itself has become divided in the past year between leaders such as David Alfaro Siqueiros, who favors agitation, and Martinez Verdugo, who favors more discreet action which would limit political repercussions.

Siqueiros, currently in prison for fomenting unrest, appears to have been a key figure in the support in Mexico of extremist agitation over the past year. He has apparently had Cuban support. In August or September 1959 Siqueiros' brother-in-law, Leopoldo Arenal Bastar, was given possession of arms which had been stored in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, presumably for use by a group described by Arenal as being composed of "dissatisfied petroleum workers, railroad workers, and

* The Trotskyist ~~Partido~~^{Partido} Obrero Revolucionario (POR) was founded in mid-1959. Its leaders include Jorge Maza, a railroad worker; Herman Fraga, ~~Maga~~, a student; Carlos Lopez, a painter; and Jaime Estrada Lopez, a law student. Like its Cuban counterpart, it officially identifies itself with the IV International.

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teachers." In November 1959, Arenal sought additional arms from Cuban sources for the ~~X~~Alfaro Siqueiros group^h. In January 1960, Siqueiros strongly criticized President Lopez Mateos of Mexico and praised the Cuban Revolution, receiving emphatic support from the then Cuban Ambassador, Salvador Massip. In February, Leopoldo Arenal again appeared at the Cuban Embassy selling Siqueiros' prints in order to buy parts for portable radios to be used in Mexico, and in July, certain members of the Mexican delegation to the First Latin American Youth Congress in Habana took with them a painting by Siqueiros to sell in order to buy arms for an armed revolution.

It is of interest that the principal controversy which developed at the Youth Congress in Habana concerned the recognition of the credentials of certain "Trotskyst" delegates from Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. Of the Mexican delegation, which represented some twenty-three student and youth organizations, representatives of five groups supported the recognition of delegates of the Mexican Trotskyst Partido Obrero Revolucionario and wished the congress to officially denounce the government of President Lopez Mateos. This group included representatives from the Communist Youth of Mexico (JCM), ~~X~~the youth affiliate of the PCM, the "revolutionary sector" of the National Teachers Union (SNTE), the Worker-Farmer Party of Mexico (POCM), and the University Student Federation (FEU). Fourteen other groups, however, opposed the recognition of the Trotsky^{sts} and the denunciation of the Mexican government. This group was led by the Popular Youth (JP), which is the affiliate of Vicente Lombardo Toledano's Popular Socialist Party (PPS), and other groups controlled by the PPS. This faction gained the support of the congress, to the discredit of the PCM.

This controversy, although not known to be a reflection of the Sino-Soviet dispute, appears to parallel two of the fundamental points of Sino-Soviet disagreement: the degree to which violence shall be used to effect

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the transition to Socialism; and the degree to which the national bourgeoisie (represented by Lopez Mateos) can be trusted and used as allies.

Since their defeat at the Youth Congress, the extremist elements in Mexico have been further weakened by the repressive measures taken by the government against student and teacher demonstrators in August, including the arrest of Siqueiros,* and by the removal of Leonel Padilla and Cesar Augusto Velasco Sandoval from their positions of leadership in the Communist Youth. The basic reason for the removal of Padilla and Velasco, which was effected by the Communist party leaders, was reported to be their close connection and collaboration with the Trotskyist POR. It was Padilla, apparently, who had been in charge of the sale of the Siqueiros painting in Cuba for *the purchase of arms.* armed revolutionary funding. Somewhat later, the expulsion of two members of the Juventud Comunista for advocating armed revolt in Mexico was reported.

prosecution

The foregoing information suggests that a purge of extremist elements ~~from~~ among the orthodox Communists has been taking place, paralleled by governmental action which has resulted in the imprisonment or persecution of Communist and extreme leftist agitators. Although all the Communist organizations protest the imprisonment of Demetrio Vallejo, Dionisio Encina, David Alfaro Siqueiros, and others, the practical result of the arrests has favored the elements which seem to support the Khrushchev line, and has weakened the extremist elements among whom ~~the~~ Chinese views might find support. The current dominance of the pro-Soviet elements within the orthodox Communist party is illustrated in an editorial in the PCM organ La Voz de Mexico for 1 January 1961. This lauds the CPSU, supports coexistence as the policy for world Communism, and ignores Communist China.

* Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, arrested at the same time, was released and represented the PCM at the meeting of Communist parties in Moscow, returning on 18 December. Oton Salazar, leader of the revolutionary sector of the Mexican Teachers' Union (SNTE), is now reported ~~dis-~~credited within the SNTE.

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As indicated above, in connection with the conflict which developed at the Latin American Youth Congress, the policies of the Peoples' Socialist Party (PPS), led by Vicente Lombardo Toledano, tend to support the Soviet, rather than the Chinese, point of view. The PPS, which defines itself as ~~(X)Marxist-Leninist(X)~~ favors "the constant development of the existing democratic regime and, in due course, of the peoples' democracy, in order to arrive at the establishment of the socialist regime." In practice, it defends collaboration with the bourgeois administration of President Lopez Mateos, which it seeks to infiltrate and influence, and attacks ~~(X)sectarian(X)~~ opposition to the administration as counterproductive.

Lombardo's policies were exemplified in his condemnation of the railroad strike of March 1959, which was supported by the PCM and the POCM~~(X)~~ and which resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of Demetrio Vallejo and other leaders, and subsequently Dionisio Encina. Lombardo's statement concerning the strike came on 30 April¹⁹⁵⁹ after his return from the USSR. Later, in July¹⁹⁵⁹, he ~~told~~^{was informed} party members that he had been told by Soviet Communist leaders to assume the ~~(X)dominant role(X)~~ in all leftist activities in Mexico. Subsequently^{in 1960}, Lombardo has reorganized and renamed his party to identify it more closely with international Communism; ~~and~~^{he has} reportedly gained Soviet approval of the PPS platform as the basis for an anti-imperialist front in Mexico. He has also stated privately that Soviet and satellite officials instructed him to ~~(X)reactivate(X)~~ all existing friendship societies under his control and direction.

There can be little doubt that Lombardo has been well informed on the Sino-Soviet rift through his high WFTU position and his Soviet contacts. He attended the twenty-first meeting of the ~~WFTU~~ Executive Committee of the WFTU as well as the WFTU General Council Meeting in Peiping in June 1960, at which the dispute began to grow heated. Subsequently, Lombardo published an article in Siempre (Mexico City, 20 July

1960) presenting an examination of the international scene "as seen from China", and representing "the opinions of the leaders and the people of the countries which are building Socialism". The article serves to support the Soviet point of view, however, with respect to the catastrophic nature of a new war which "for the Socialist countries, would represent the immediate paralyzation of their constructive programs; that is to say, the impossibility of building Socialism within the anticipated time."

In summary, it is apparent that the Soviets have made a strenuous effort to strengthen their position in Mexico, relying heavily on the PPS and certain leaders of the PCM. Chinese views, although known to party leaders, have found no significant support or acknowledgment. However, there exist certain pro-Cuban extremist elements, Trotsky^{sts}~~ists~~, and disgruntled Stalinists who may favorably respond to Chinese Communist overtures, should these be made to them. Although there is little prospect of the development of a strong pro-Chinese Communist element in Mexico, the existence of a great number of separate, rival Communist parties and cliques may provide a useful index to the nature of various international ideological trends or schisms.

IV. Other Latin American Countries

In other Latin American countries there are also differences within the CP's and between the CP's and other revolutionary groups which are similar to those existing in Cuba and Mexico. These involve conflicts between 'activists' and 'pacifists', between youth and age, between the inexperienced and the experienced. For example, the head of the Radical Youth in Chile recently wrote to a friend and former Cuban student leader, now an INRA official, that:

"In Chile... a start must be made at once. Only one of the political leaders of Chile has the mind and determination to pursue the revolutionary course. That is Clotario Blest.... This attitude has almost brought him to disgrace in the eyes of the leftist political leaders, especially those of the Communist Party, who think we must still wait indefinitely.

In Brazil, a conflict exists within the CP itself, where a leftist faction headed by Mauricio Grabois, Calil Chadde, Carlos Danielli, and others has opposed the policies defined in the party's ^{present program,} ~~Theses of March~~ ~~1954~~, which they claim defer ~~the~~ socialist goals and abandon ~~the~~ consideration of violent action. This controversy is apparently becoming linked with the problem of the support of the Cuban revolution, and the dissatisfaction of the Fidelistas with the ~~pacifist~~ policies of the PSP is being duplicated in their attitude toward the PSP. Thus Calil Chadde ~~and~~ ~~claimed~~ that certain Cuban revolutionary leaders had complained to him in August 1960 about the lack of Brazilian support for the Cuban ~~Revolu-~~ tion, and a Brazilian editor, who conferred with Prensa Latina executives in Habana in November, reported that unnamed Cuban officials had criticized the Brazilian CP for refusing to allow other groups, such as the Trotskyites, to join in pro-Cuban activities. The Cubans indicated that they would like to find some ~~other~~ group other than the CP to assume direction of pro-Cuban activities in Brazil, but that the CP was the only one which could be relied on.

Conflicts of this type exist also in other countries ~~and~~ and may easily become associated with the PSP-Fidelista conflict and also, eventually, with the Sino-Soviet conflict as the two Communist powers seek to extend or strengthen their ~~respective~~ policies and as local Communists or revolutionaries look for support for their own policies or tactics ~~as~~ determined by their own views of the opportunities presented by the immediate national political situation. To date, there has been little evidence of direct Chinese involvement in such factionalism and conflict that does exist, but this situation ^{may} ~~could~~ change now that a Chinese Communist base for operations has been established in Habana.